The russian armed forces are being judged less by their early failures in Ukraine than by what they learned after them. That shift matters because airpower specialists now warn that Russia’s air arm is more capable in some crucial respects, even after heavy losses. The surprise is not that the force was tested in war, but that the test may have sharpened its edge. For NATO planners, that means the threat is not static. It has been changed by combat, production, and experience, and the result is a more difficult picture than the one many observers first assumed.
Why the russian armed forces matter now
The central issue is timing. Russia’s war in Ukraine has given its pilots combat experience and lessons in modern warfare, while upgrades in systems and weaponry have continued. At the same time, Russia has been producing more aircraft than it has lost. Together, those factors matter because they alter the balance between immediate battlefield attrition and longer-term capability. Justin Bronk, an airpower expert at the UK’s Royal United Services Institute, said in a recent report that Russian airpower “represents a greater threat to Western air power capabilities in Europe than it did prior to the invasion of Ukraine. ” That assessment frames the debate around the russian armed forces as one of adaptation, not simple decline.
Losses have been heavy, but they do not tell the whole story
Bronk said around 130 Russian fixed-wing aircraft have been shot down or badly damaged in the fighting. His estimate draws on interviews with Western air forces and ministries, data from Ukraine’s armed forces, and open-source information. Those losses are significant, but the context matters. The aircraft types that have suffered the highest losses, including the Su-25SM and Su-34(M), are not considered especially useful to Russia in a conflict with NATO. That means the most visible damage does not map neatly onto the threat Russia would pose in a different war.
At the same time, production has continued to offset part of the attrition. Russia has been able to produce more of its Su-35S, Su-34s, and Su-30SM aircraft than it has lost in the war, while deliveries of other aircraft types have continued. In practical terms, the russian armed forces are not just losing aircraft; they are reshaping the fleet. That is why the headline losses, while real, do not by themselves define the strategic picture.
What combat experience changed inside the air force
The second major change is the aircrew cadre. Bronk said Russia’s pilots have become significantly more capable during the war. Even though Russia has lost experienced crew members, it has lost far fewer pilots than jets. That distinction matters because skilled pilots are harder to replace in any air force. Bronk also said the losses in capable crews have been “more than offset” by the additional flying time and combat experience gained in Ukraine. He added that for a long time Russian pilots generally flew far less than their NATO counterparts.
That gap now appears narrower in one important sense: the russian armed forces have turned peacetime habits into wartime practice. The significance is not just that pilots have flown more, but that they have done so in a conflict that forced adaptation under pressure. For NATO, that raises the question of whether old assumptions about Russian proficiency still fit current reality.
NATO’s reassessment and the wider regional impact
Retired US Army Maj. Gen. Gordon “Skip” Davis, who served as NATO’s deputy assistant secretary-general for its defense-investment division, said NATO needs to upgrade its view of Russia’s air force. “NATO can’t be complacent with what it thought Russia once was as an air power versus what it is now, ” he said. Davis added that “Russia is more dangerous now to NATO than it was before the war because of lessons learned. ”
That warning has implications beyond aircraft counts. If the russian armed forces now combine wartime experience with continued production and retained high-end capability, the strategic challenge becomes more about readiness and adaptation than about simple attrition. Bronk’s broader warning is that policymakers may be downgrading the threat because they focus too heavily on Russia’s early failure to achieve air superiority and its significant aircraft losses. In his view, “in many respects, the VKS of 2025 is a significantly more capable potential threat for Western air forces than it was in 2022. ”
The regional consequence is straightforward: a more experienced and better-stocked Russian air arm complicates defense planning across Europe. The unresolved question is not whether the war has cost Russia aircraft, but whether it has also created a more dangerous force for the next confrontation.
