The russian air force is being reassessed not for what it failed to do in the opening phase of the war, but for what it learned after that failure. Airpower specialists now warn that combat in Ukraine has made Russia’s air arm more capable in some crucial respects, even after heavy losses. The result is a sharper threat picture for NATO, one shaped by experience, adaptation, and production rather than by the early narrative of setback alone.
Why the threat picture has changed
The central argument is straightforward: Russia’s war in Ukraine has given its pilots combat experience and lessons in modern warfare. It has also pushed upgrades in systems and weaponry, while Russia has been producing more aircraft than it has lost. That combination matters because it changes the balance between short-term attrition and long-term capability. In this reading, the russian air force is not being judged by one phase of the war, but by how it has adapted during it.
Justin Bronk, an airpower expert at the UK’s Royal United Services Institute, said in a recent report that Russian airpower “represents a greater threat to Western air power capabilities in Europe than it did prior to the invasion of Ukraine. ” That assessment is important because it challenges the assumption that visible battlefield difficulties necessarily equal strategic decline. Air combat, in this case, appears to have sharpened Russia’s military understanding rather than simply depleted it.
Losses, but not the whole story
Bronk said around 130 Russian fixed-wing aircraft have been shot down or badly damaged in the fighting. His estimates draw on interviews with Western air forces and ministries, data from Ukraine’s armed forces, and open-source information. Those losses are real, and they matter. But the argument is that they do not tell the full story about the russian air force.
The aircraft types that have suffered the highest losses, such as the Su-25SM and Su-34(M), are not considered especially useful to Russia in a conflict with NATO. At the same time, new production has expanded the overall fleet. Russia has been able to produce more of its Su-35S, Su-34s, and Su-30SM aircraft than it has lost in the war, while deliveries of other aircraft types have continued. In practical terms, that means the force profile is not simply shrinking; it is changing.
Combat experience is now part of the equation
Another factor is the aircrew cadre. Bronk said Russia’s pilots have become significantly more capable during the war. Even though Russia has lost experienced crew members, it has lost far fewer pilots than jets. That distinction matters because skilled pilots are harder to replace than aircraft in any air force. For NATO planners, the concern is not only how many platforms remain, but how those platforms may be used by crews with more operational experience.
Bronk also said the losses in capable crews have been “more than offset” by the additional flying time and combat experience gained in Ukraine. He added that for a long time Russian pilots generally flew far less than their NATO counterparts. The war has narrowed that gap in one important sense: it has turned a force once measured by peacetime routines into one tested by sustained combat.
NATO’s reassessment and the wider European impact
Retired US Army Maj. Gen. Gordon “Skip” Davis, who served as NATO’s deputy assistant secretary-general for its defense-investment division, said NATO needs to upgrade its view of Russia’s air force. “NATO can’t be complacent with what it thought Russia once was as an air power versus what it is now, ” he said. “Russia is more dangerous now to NATO than it was before the war because of lessons learned. ”
That warning points to the wider regional effect. If policymakers continue to measure the russian air force only against its early failures in Ukraine, they may underestimate the force that emerges from the conflict. Bronk said that many NATO policymakers and military observers downgraded the threat after Russia failed to achieve air superiority and suffered significant aircraft losses. He argued that this is a mistake because “in many respects, the VKS of 2025 is a significantly more capable potential threat for Western air forces than it was in 2022. ”
For Europe, the issue is not simply how Russia performed in 2022, but how its air arm has evolved since then. A force that has learned in combat, preserved some of its best aircraft and weapons, and expanded parts of its fleet presents a different challenge than one frozen by early embarrassment. The russian air force is therefore best understood as a wartime institution that has been tested, adapted and partially rebuilt at the same time.
The question now is whether NATO’s planning, procurement and threat assumptions will move as quickly as Russia’s own battlefield lessons have.
