In Sanaa, the Houthis have filled a square with chants and flags, but not missiles—at least not yet. In the week since the US-Israeli attacks on Iran began on February 28, the movement’s public posture has been loud in rhetoric and careful in action, even as its leader warns that “hands are on the trigger” and that intervention could come “at any moment” depending on developments.
Why are the Houthis holding back right now?
The restraint is not the same as retreat. Analysts describe a movement weighing its options under the shadow of retaliation and leadership risk. Luca Nevola, senior analyst for Yemen and the Gulf at the ACLED conflict monitor, said the current priority is avoiding direct US and Israeli retaliation, even while the possibility of intervention remains open and could unfold as “a phased escalation. ”
That caution is tied to painful recent memory. Nevola pointed to Israeli strikes last August in Sanaa that killed at least 12 high-ranking Houthi government members, including Prime Minister Ahmed al-Rahawi and chief of staff Mohammed al-Ghumari. The losses were among the heaviest the group has endured during its confrontation with the US and Israel, leaving leadership more wary of risking a heavy aerial campaign on areas it controls.
Nevola described the internal fear bluntly: the movement seems concerned about Israeli intelligence and the possibility of leadership decapitation—an anxiety that can turn every decision about escalation into a decision about personal survival, not only strategy.
What did Abdel-Malik al-Houthi say—and what does it signal?
Houthi chief Abdel-Malik al-Houthi framed his group’s stance as political and potentially military alignment with Tehran. He said this week that “Yemen stands clearly with the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Muslim Iranian people. ” Then he underscored that the choice to act could be immediate: “hands are on the trigger” regarding military escalation, and engagement in the war could occur at any moment depending on developments.
In a separate warning, al-Houthi said, “Regarding military escalation and action, our fingers are on the trigger, ready to respond at any moment should developments warrant it. ” The language is intentionally conditional—preparedness without a declared timetable—leaving space for deterrence messaging while keeping operational ambiguity.
That ambiguity shapes daily life in Houthi-controlled areas. The public display is unmistakable: large gatherings at Sabeen Square, under Houthi control, have protested the strikes on Iran and condemned the attacks. Yet the week has also been notable for what did not happen: the Houthis have limited support for Tehran to rhetoric and mass protest, rather than opening a new front.
Could the Houthis still enter the war—and what might trigger it?
The possibility remains explicitly on the table. Nevola said the Houthis would likely resume attacks if they were directly drawn into the conflict, either through US or Israeli strikes or through a renewed domestic advance by anti-Houthi forces in Yemen. That outlines a set of triggers rooted in self-defense and internal balance, rather than solidarity alone.
Sadam al-Huraibi, a Yemeni political commentator, argued the threshold could also be political. He said Yemen’s Houthis will enter the war if Iran requests it. In his view, Tehran’s approach is to conserve leverage: it “does not want to use all its cards at once, ” aiming to save the Houthi group for a coming phase. “I believe that the Houthis’ entry into the war is only a matter of time, ” al-Huraibi said, adding that if the Israeli-American attacks on Iran do not stop, “the Yemeni group will not stand idly by endlessly, ” and that preparations for war are underway in Sanaa and the provinces the group controls.
From another vantage point, Israeli military voices have expressed surprise at the lack of immediate Houthi attacks as the wider regional conflict has unfolded. There has been speculation within Israel’s defense establishment that the Houthis are staying out because the US is involved, and separate speculation that the group could still join.
What does “support” look like without direct intervention?
For now, support has taken the form of messaging and public mobilization. The movement’s slogan is stark and confrontational: “Allah is Greater. Death to America. Death to Israel. Curse on the Jews. Victory to Islam. ” In the streets, rallies have included symbolic acts, including demonstrators walking over British and US flags.
Yet analysts caution that the absence of intervention does not equal incapacity. Nevola said the group is not entirely incapacitated despite last year’s losses and could still launch assaults on adversaries. Al-Huraibi described capabilities in similarly broad terms, saying the Houthis can create chaos in the Red Sea—where they have launched repeated attacks on shipping as part of a campaign they say was in support of Gaza—and can launch drones and missiles toward Israel.
In other words, the current calm is a posture, not a guarantee. The Houthis are balancing multiple pressures at once: external retaliation risk, internal security after leadership losses, and regional expectations from allies. Nadwa Al-Dawsari, an expert on Yemen and an associate fellow at the Middle East Institute, characterized the logic as strategic reserve, describing the Houthis as a “last line of resistance” within Iran’s broader coalition of proxies, particularly after other members were degraded.
Al-Dawsari also offered a forward-looking warning shaped by regional dynamics: she said she believes the Houthis will intervene at some point, and that the longer the war continues, the more likely that becomes. She added that the Houthis have “been itching” to attack Saudi Arabia, and that if the Saudis intervene, the movement would find a reason to attack them.
Back in Sabeen Square, what happens next?
At street level, the distance between a rally and a strike can feel like a single decision. The square can fill again; the speeches can sharpen; the slogans can harden into orders. For residents in Sanaa, the week’s quiet has carried its own tension: a sense that the city is being held in place by calculations made far from the checkpoints and rooftops.
The movement’s leader has already provided the closing line of the moment—prepared, watching, conditional. If developments “warrant it, ” the Houthis say they are ready. Until then, Sabeen Square remains a stage for mass anger rather than open war, and the question hanging over the city is not what has happened, but what will be deemed enough to make the warning real for the Houthis.
