In Tehran, the word directions can feel less like a map and more like a question: where does a country turn when its closest diplomatic partners speak loudly but stop short of stepping in? In the days after the US-Israeli attack on Iran, Russia and China condemned the assault, pushed the issue to the United Nations Security Council, and warned against escalation—yet neither signaled a willingness to offer military support.
What do Russia and China say—and what are they not doing?
Russia and China, described as Tehran’s two most powerful diplomatic partners, condemned the US-Israeli attack on Iran and labelled the war a clear violation of international law. Both countries joined in requesting an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council, an action that underscores their shared preference for multilateral forums when tensions spike.
President Vladimir Putin called the assassination of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on Saturday a “cynical violation of all norms of human morals. ” In Beijing, China’s Foreign Affairs Minister Wang Yi told Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar that “force cannot truly solve problems, ” while urging all sides to avoid further escalation.
But the limit has been visible: despite sharp rhetoric, neither Russia nor China indicated a willingness to intervene militarily to support Iran. Those boundaries matter in a war that, in the context provided, has killed more than 1, 000 people.
Directions and expectations: Why a treaty still doesn’t mean a military alliance
The current moment sits atop years of public coordination. Moscow and Beijing have signed bilateral deals with Tehran and expanded coordination through joint naval drills, projecting a united front against what they describe as a US-led international order that has long sought to isolate them.
Russia and Iran also signed a comprehensive strategic partnership treaty in January 2025, covering areas from trade and military cooperation to science, culture, and education. The agreement deepened defence and intelligence coordination and supported projects such as transport corridors linking Russia to the Gulf through Iran. They carried out joint military drills in the Indian Ocean as recently as late February, the week before the United States and Israel attacked Iran.
Yet the treaty did not include a mutual defence clause, meaning it stopped short of forming a formal military alliance and did not obligate Moscow to respond once the war began. In practical terms, those legal details shape the diplomatic directions available to Iran: the partnership may support coordination and projects, but it does not automatically trigger a military response.
Who is explaining the limits, and what frustrations are emerging?
Andrey Kortunov, former director general of the Russian International Affairs Council and a member of the Valdai Discussion Club, described the difference between Russia’s arrangement with Iran and a “more binding” agreement. He pointed to Russia’s 2024 mutual defence treaty with North Korea as an example where Russia would be obliged to join North Korea “in any conflict the country might get involved in. ” By contrast, with Iran, Kortunov said the agreement “just mentioned that both sides agreed to abstain from any hostile actions in case the other side is engaged in conflict. ”
Kortunov added that Russia is unlikely to take direct military action in support of Iran because the risks would be too high. He also said Moscow appears to be “prioritising the United States mediation in the conflict with Ukraine, ” and noted that Russia has previously taken a similar approach—criticising US actions in places like Venezuela after the US military attack and arrest of its President, Nicolas Maduro, in January.
Even when legal language is clear, political expectations can still collide with reality. Kortunov said that some of his contacts in Tehran expressed a “degree of frustration, ” with an “expectation that Russia should somehow do more than just diplomatic moves in the United Nations Security Council or in other multilateral forums. ” The gap between condemnation and commitment is not only strategic; it is felt personally by those who believed partnership would translate into protection.
What about China’s relationship with Iran—what is in place, and what is still uncertain?
China and Iran signed a 25-year cooperation agreement in 2021 aimed at expanding ties in areas such as energy, while also drawing Iran into China’s Belt and Road Initiative. The context provided indicates a long-term framework for cooperation, but—like the Russia-Iran treaty described above—it does not, in the details available here, translate into an explicit military commitment.
Jodie Wen, a postdoctoral fellow at the Centre for International Security and Strategy (CISS) at Tsinghua University in China, is identified as having travelled frequently to Iran, though the provided context ends before her perspective is fully stated. Still, her inclusion signals that specialists who study security and strategy are closely watching the limits of partnership when conflict escalates.
For Tehran, this is where diplomacy becomes a daily test of priorities: how to extract meaningful support from relationships built on deals, drills, and shared critiques—without the guarantee of battlefield assistance.
What responses are on the table right now?
In the immediate term, the concrete steps named in the context are diplomatic: condemnation of the attack, calls to avoid escalation, and a joint request by Russia and China for an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council. These moves put international law and multilateral pressure at the center of the response.
But they also reveal the boundaries of action as described by Kortunov: for Moscow, direct military involvement carries risks deemed too high, and the treaty language does not compel intervention. For Beijing, the emphasis—based on Wang Yi’s words—has been on rejecting force as a solution and urging restraint.
In that space between outrage and restraint, Iran’s next choices are constrained by what partners are prepared to do publicly, legally, and militarily—constraints that will likely shape its diplomatic directions in the days ahead.
Back in Tehran, the question remains: when condemnation fills the air and Security Council meetings are requested, what changes for the people living through the consequences of war? For now, directions point toward diplomacy, not intervention—and the distance between those two paths is where frustration and uncertainty continue to grow.
