Lagos and the new roads push: six projects approved, but demolition decisions raise hard questions

Lagos is now at the center of a federal infrastructure moment that mixes sweeping promises with a blunt admission: one of the city’s most sensitive bridge assets, the Carter Bridge, is no longer seen as repairable and is slated for demolition and replacement.
What exactly has been approved—and what does Lagos lose before it gains?
Minister of Works Dav Umahi disclosed that President Bola Tinubu approved the construction of six major road projects across Nigeria, alongside the proposed demolition of the Carter Bridge in Lagos and the redesign of a new bridge. The Lagos element is unusually direct: technical evaluations and stakeholder consultations concluded the existing Carter Bridge structure can no longer be rehabilitated and must be demolished and replaced.
For Lagos residents and businesses that rely on bridge crossings, the public-facing contradiction is immediate: a decision framed as an engineering necessity also introduces disruption risk that is not addressed in the approval summary. What is verified from the minister’s disclosure is the direction of travel—demolition and replacement, not repair—and the formal step now underway to translate that decision into procurement.
Which costs, contractors, and designs are already on the table?
Several of the approvals came with costs, design shifts, or contractor changes, offering a rare snapshot of how federal road decisions are being structured.
Verified fact: Umahi said the design and costing of a new Carter Bridge project in Lagos is set at ₦5. 6 billion. He added that Advanced Engineering Consultants has been engaged to carry out detailed design and cost assessment ahead of the procurement process for construction of the new bridge.
Verified fact: The Suleja–Minna Road was originally awarded to Salini Construction Company, then terminated for poor performance after only 10 km was completed. The federal government resolved to complete the remaining 71 kilometres of the dual carriageway. Umahi said one carriageway was awarded to China Geo-Engineering Corporation (CGC) at a cost of ₦91 billion, while the second carriageway received clearance from the Bureau of Public Procurement (BPP).
Verified fact: The 132 km Kano–Kongolam Road, a tax credit project originally awarded in 2022, was reviewed and rescoped from asphalt to a three-lane concrete carriageway. The upgraded design includes solar-powered streetlights and closed-circuit television (CCTV) installations to enhance security. The revised estimate is ₦334 billion.
Verified fact: The Abuja–Lokoja Road is to be reconstructed after termination of contracts with two underperforming contractors. Umahi said the affected 86-kilometre section would be reconstructed using reinforced concrete and handled by five contractors, including Julius Berger. The estimate is ₦146 billion.
Verified fact: The Ibadan–Ife–Ilesa Road reconstruction covers a 103-kilometre dual carriageway valued at ₦427 billion. Umahi said it was awarded by the previous administration but recorded little progress before the current government reviewed and re-awarded the contract.
Verified fact: Phase Two of the Keffi–Nasarawa–Abaji Road rehabilitation covers 129. 3 kilometres at a cost of ₦203 billion. Umahi said it will improve connectivity between Nasarawa State and the Federal Capital Territory.
Why the pivot to concrete—and what does it imply for timelines and accountability?
Alongside the project approvals, Umahi has also articulated a broader policy direction: less asphalt, more concrete, with durability presented as the justification.
Verified fact: In Awka, during an inspection visit on the ongoing reconstruction of the Enugu–Onitsha express, Umahi directed contractors handling federal road projects across the country to apply concrete cement, stating it would ensure roads last for 100 years. He also stated that nobody guarantees asphalt for more than 15 years in Nigeria, while concrete roads under President Ahmed Bola Tinubu come with a 100-year guarantee.
Verified fact: Umahi said the immigration junction/Amansea border section of the Enugu–Onitsha express way would be completed by May 2026 (ET). He said the project is being done by Reynolds Construction Company (RCC) and funded by tax paid by MTN communication firm. He also referenced subcontractor Niger Cat and cited progress figures for segments being executed with concrete.
Informed analysis (clearly labeled): The promise of longevity becomes a central accountability yardstick. If concrete is the new standard, the public interest shifts toward what “guarantee” means in enforceable terms, how performance is measured over time, and whether procurement and supervision systems can match the ambition. The approvals outlined by Umahi include terminations for poor performance and a re-award due to limited progress—signals that durability claims alone do not resolve delivery risks.
Who benefits, who is implicated, and what has been said publicly?
Verified fact: The approvals and directives are tied to President Bola Tinubu and disclosed by Minister of Works Dav Umahi. The Bureau of Public Procurement is named as having given clearance for part of the Suleja–Minna Road arrangement. Contractors and entities explicitly named include China Geo-Engineering Corporation (CGC), Julius Berger, Advanced Engineering Consultants, Reynolds Construction Company (RCC), Niger Cat, Salini Construction Company (terminated), and MTN communication firm (tax credit funding referenced for the Enugu–Onitsha project).
Verified fact: Umahi said sustained inspection of road projects across the country is aimed at ensuring Nigerians get value for money. He also urged people in the Southeast geopolitical zone to appreciate Tinubu for massive road projects in the region and to support the President’s “Renewed Hope Agenda. ”
Informed analysis (clearly labeled): The stakeholder map shows a system leaning on named contractors, redesign decisions, and tax credit-backed work. That can speed delivery for certain corridors, but it also concentrates public scrutiny on procurement sequencing and performance oversight—especially where projects were terminated, rescoped, or re-awarded. In Lagos, the Carter Bridge decision elevates scrutiny further because demolition is irreversible and replacement requires flawless planning and communication to maintain public confidence.
What should the public demand next as Lagos enters a demolition-and-rebuild pathway?
Verified fact: For Lagos, the federal government has moved to design and costing of a new Carter Bridge at ₦5. 6 billion, with Advanced Engineering Consultants tasked with detailed design and cost assessment ahead of procurement. Umahi said technical evaluations and stakeholder consultations concluded the existing structure can no longer be rehabilitated.
Verified fact: Umahi also said the federal government plans to commission at least four major road projects in each of the six geopolitical zones by May 15 (ET).
Informed analysis (clearly labeled): The contradiction at the heart of this moment is simple: Nigeria is announcing major builds while simultaneously acknowledging that past performance problems forced contract terminations and redesigns. For Lagos, the key public-interest test is whether the same transparency applied to announcing demolition is applied to the steps that follow—detailed engineering scope, procurement milestones, and oversight plans that prove the replacement will arrive as promised. Until those details are made explicit, Lagos remains the symbol of both infrastructure ambition and the accountability burden that comes with it—especially with Lagos.




